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ASSEMBLY-CONVICTIONS OF CIVIL RIGHIS
DEMONSTRATORS FOR TRESPASS UPHELD*
The inevitable conflict between the fundamental individual
freedoms of free speech and assembly and the power of govern-
ment to keep the peace and to protect the interest of a civilized
community has given rise to a "living branch" of the law. The
law in this field has not ended its development by evolving into
a static set of rules. Conversely, the law remains, as it must, in
a state of flexibility through which it can adapt to the many
variations of the conflict between the right to disseminate ideas
in public places and the power of government to regulate in the
interest of its citizens. The problem has proved as persistent as
it is perplexing, and it has fallen the lot of the courts to weigh in
the balance the circumstances underlying and the reasons for the
regulation of the first amendment rights. In the case of Adder-
ley v. Florida,1 the Supreme Court again undertook this delicate
and difficult task.
In Adderley the petitioners, Florida A. & M. University stu-
dents, "demonstrated" at the county jail against policies of
racial segregation and the previous arrest of fellow students.
The petitioners did not leave the jail house grounds after being
told by the county sheriff that those remaining would be ar-
rested. The petitioners were arrested and convicted on a charge
of "trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent."2 On
appeal the convictions were affirmed by the Florida Circuit
Court and then by the Florida District Court of Appeals.8
The United States Supreme Court, affirming, held that the
trespass statute did not come within the constitutional prohibi-
tion of vagueness and that, in light of the facts, the arrest and
conviction of the petitioners under it did not deprive them of
*Adderley v. Florida, 87 S. Ct. 242 (1966).
1. 87 S. Ct 242 (1966).
2. "Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a mali-
cious and mischievous intent, the punishment of which is not specially provided
for, shall be punishment by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by
fine not exceeding one hundred dollars." FLA. STAT. § 821.18, F.S.A. (1965).
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their constitutional rights to freedom of speech, press, assembly
and petition.4
The task of balancing the first amendment freedoms against
governmental authority, undertaken by the Court in Adderley,
was not an unfamiliar one. For years the legislatures, local
authorities and the courts have grappled with the problem, and
the decisions in this field have grown into a veritable forest.
Since legislative and administrative bodies must adapt their
policies to the decisions of the Court, a "cruise of the timber"5 is
necessary to appreciate the Supreme Court's resolution of the
issue in Adderey.
The fourteenth amendment has long been recognized as the
protector of the first amendment freedoms of speech, press and
assembly against state encroachment." However, the question of
when, and to what degree, the state may regulate the opportun-
ity to exercise these rights still presents a very real problem. The
Court's decisions, although they seldom produce concrete an-
swers, can provide guidelines.
In one category of cases the balancing test is easily applied.
In these cases free dissemination of ideas in public is placed
above the interest of a state or municipality in keeping its streets
clean. In Hague v. CI0 7 an ordinance was held void on its face
because it provided for prior administrative censorship of the
exercise of the right of speech and assembly in public places.
The Court in Schneider 'v. lrvington8 acknowledged that munici-
pal authorities have a duty to keep streets open and uncluttered
and, as long as legislation for this purpose does not encroach
upon the constitutional rights of one rightfully on a street for
the purpose of distributing hand bills, the regulation should
stand. The liberty of expression is superior to a claim that it
could be exercised elsewhere. 9 In Jamison v. Teivas,10 another
case in this area, the Court struck down a conviction under a
municipal ordinance forbidding the distribution of handbills by
4. Adderley v. Florida, 87 S. Ct. 242 (1966).
5. Niemotko v Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951).
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Dejonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937).
7. 307 U.S. 496 (1938).
8. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
9. Id. at 163.
10. 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1939).
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saying that the right of a person lawfully on a public street to
express his views extends to the communication of ideas by
literature as well as the spoken word.
The regulation of solicitation has been the issue in a group of
related cases.'1 Here, the interest of government in protecting
the public from fraud and from criminals who use solicitation
as a device to enter homes is more substantial. However, the
state or municipality must exercise caution in this area because
legislative motives which could support regulation of other
activities may be insufficient where first amendment freedoms
are involved. The Supreme Court will not permit the police to
exercise too broad a discretionary power.12 In Cantwell v. Con-
nectiout' a state statute requiring a permit for religious solici-
tation was struck down as allowing too wide an exercise of
discretion by the state official. The Court there stated that
"because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, and the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as actual application of sanctions, govern-
ment may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."14
A municipal ordinance controlling solicitation by the exercise of
discretion by the mayor was held to be an unconstitutional
abridgement of the freedoms of speech, religion and press in
Largent v. Texas. 5 Thus, licensing systems must be based on
well defined criteria for administrative discretion and must
relate to a proper regulation of public places.16
Still different considerations arise in the area of control of
speeches made on public property and streets. The opposing
interests in these instances are protection of the public peace to-
gether with recreational and transportation uses for which the
public property and streets exist. 17 The states are entitled to
protect themselves from the abuse of the privilege of their insti-
tutions. On the other hand, free political discussion is deemed
11. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 277 (1951); Largent v. Texas,
318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider
v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
12. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
13. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
14. Id. at 311.
15. 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
16. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
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essential to the security of our society and the courts have deter-
mined that state regulation can be justified only if it deals with
the abuse of the rights of free speech, press or assembly. The
rights themselves must not be curtailed by statutes so vague or
indefinite as to allow punishment for a fair exercise of this op-
portunity of expression.18 The concept of an absolute right to
control the use of public parks was rejected in Hague v. 010.
The Court in Hague, however, did not rule out all regulation but
confined its holding to the invalidation of arbitrary supression.19
It is clear that the Constitution does not deny localities the
power to construct a licensing system if the exercise of discretion
by the licensing officials is sufficiently confined.20 The princi-
ple that governmental authority may, by reasonable nondis-
criminatory regulations, preserve peace, order and tranquility
effectively negates any conception that the first amendment free-
doms guarantee that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express
may gather around him a group of listeners at any place at any
time.21
On some occasions the Supreme Court's attention has been
directed to limitations upon speech and assembly by a sanction
imposed after the event. In considering a breach of the peace
conviction in Cantwell v. Connecticut,22 the Court referred to
the "clear and present danger test" enunciated in Schenck v.
United States.23 The Court, while concluding that on the facts
of the case there was no clear and present danger to public peace
and order24 recognized that if such a menace did exist the power
of the state to prevent or punish would be obvious.28 In Feiner
v. New York26 a danger to public peace and order was found
and a conviction for breach of the peace was upheld. The utter-
ance of "fighting words" by calling a policeman a "damned
racketeer" and a "damned Fascist" was deemed sufficient
18. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1930).
19. 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
20. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 280 (1951).
21. Poulous v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953).
22. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
23. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
24. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
25. Id. at 308.
26. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
[Vol. 19
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grounds upon which to sustain a conviction in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampsire.
27
The Court in Adderley gave considerable attention to the case
of Edwards v. South Carolina.28 The facts in Edwards were not
greatly dissimilar to those present in Adderley and should be ex-
amined in some detail. In Edwards the petitioners were Negroes
convicted for the common law offense of breach of the peace.
They had gathered on the South Carolina State Capitol grounds
to protest against segregation policies. They were ordered by
the police to disperse. Failing to do so, they were subsequently
arrested.29 The Supreme Court reversed by holding that the
convictions infringed upon the defendants' rights of free speech,
free assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances.8 0
The Court in Edwards pointed out that the South Carolina
Supreme Court itself acknowledged that the charge of breach
of the peace was "not susceptible of exact definition" and stated
that convictions of an offense so generalized as not to be suscep-
tible of exact definition, such as the common law offense of
breach of the peace, infringe upon the right of free speech and
assembly.31 It was pointed out that the fourteenth amendment
does not permit a state to make criminal the peaceful expression
of unpopular views,32 and, under the facts, the petitioners had
engaged in no punishable conduct. The Court stated that the
petitioners exercised their first amendment rights "in their most
pristine and classic form"33 and that the evidence "showed no
more than that the opinions which they were expressing were
sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the com-
munity to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection."3 4
Another case which the Court took pains to distinguish from
Adderley was Cox v. Louisiana,5 involving a civil rights leader
who had been convicted of breach of the peace under a Louisiana
statute. The petitioner had led a demonstration of students
27. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
29. Id. at 229.
30. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
31. Id. at 237.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 235.
34. Id. at 237.
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across the street from a court house where fellow students were
jailed. The demonstrators failed to disperse on police order, and
the petitioner was arrested. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the conviction on the grounds that the state statute
defining breach of the peace was unconstitutionally broad in
scope.30
It would appear that the Supreme Court in AdderZey could
have continued the trend of elevating the rights of freedom of
speech, assembly and petition above the attempted regulations
of civil rights demonstrations. Yet, the Court did not avail
itself of this opportunity; instead, the Court distinguished
Adderley on two grounds. "Traditionally," said the Court,
"state capitol grounds are open to the public. Jails, built for
security purposes, are not."37 In Edwards, the Court felt that
the petitioners had a right to be on the State Capitol grounds
and to carry on a peaceful demonstration. 3 It would seem that
no such right exists in regards to jailhouse grounds.39 The
Supreme Court moved to firmer ground when it pointed out that
the conviction in Adderley was based on a Florida trespass
statute.40 The Court distinguished both Edwards v. South Caro-
lina and Cow v. Louisiana on this basis. The Court stated that
the conviction in Adderley could not be attacked on the grounds
of vagueness of the statute. The statute "is aimed at conduct of
a limited kind, that is for one person or persons to trespass upon
the property of another with a malicious and mischievous in-
tent."14 "Nothing in the Constitution of the United States pre-
vents Florida from even-handed enforcement of its general tres-
pass statute against those refusing to obey the sheriff's order to
remove themselves from what amounted to the curtilage of the
jailhouse."42 The Court rejected the proposition that there is a
constitutional right to protest in any manner, at any time and at
any place in observing that "[T]he United States Constitution
does not forbid a state to control the use of its own property for
its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose."
43
36. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965).
37. Adderley v. Florida, 87 S. Ct. 242, 244 (1966).
38. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
39. Adderley v. Florida, 87 S. Ct. 242, 244 (1966).
40. For text see note 2, supra.
41. Adderley v. Florida, 87 S. Ct. 242, 244 (1966).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss3/13
1967] COMNxnTS
The decision in Adderley is not the departure from precedent
that it may appear at first blush. In Edwards4l it was acknowl-
edged that the "even-handed application of a precise and nar-
rowly regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that
certain specific conduct be limited or proscribed" would have
given rise to a different result.45 The Cox v. Louisiana decision
contained statements that "limited discretion under properly
drawn statutes and ordinances" could be vested in administrative
officials if such discretion was "exercised with 'uniformity of
method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free
from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair
discrimination.' "46 Thus, a sufficiently broad gap was left in
which the Court could insert its decision in Adderley.
If any stable thread of continuity is to be found running
through the cases of this area, it would be that "while the Court
has emphasized the importance of 'free speech', it has recog-
nized that 'free speech' is not in itself a touchstone. '47 The
Court has not turned its back upon important interests, such as
public order, when the interference with free exercise of the free-
dom of speech and assembly does not outweigh them. When the
decisions are analyzed, important questions emerge. What is the
interest which requires regulation of speech and assembly? What
is the method employed to effect the regulation of speech and
assembly? What type of speech and assembly is regulated?
Where does the regulated speech and assembly take place s If
these questions are kept in mind, the issues come into sharper
focus, for it is around these considerations that the cases turn.
H. EDWArD SMIT
44. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
45. Id. at 236.
46. 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965).
47. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOYALTY OATHS-
KEY SECTIONS OF NEW YORK'S LOYALTY
STATUTES DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL*
The appellants, as members of the University of Buffalo fac-
ulty, were required by law to sign an oath disclaiming member-
ship in the Communist Party and notifying the president of the
state university if they had previously been a member of that
party. Each appellant refused to sign the oath and was told
such refusal required their dismissal from the university.
The appellants filed suit for declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief alleging that the state's loyalty program violated the
first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly.
A three-judge federal court found that the program was consti-
tutional.1 Upon consideration of the case, the Supreme Court
reversed and found that New York Education Law section 3021
and New York Civil Service Law section 105 (1)a, (1)b and
(3), which requires removal of teachers for treasonable or sedi-
tious utterances or acts and which apparently ban mere advocacy
of abstract doctrine, to be unconstitutionally vague. The Court
also ruled invalid New York Civil Service Law section 105 (1)c
and New York Education Law section 3022 (2) insofar as they
sanction mere knowing membership in the Communist Party
of the United States or of the State of New York as grounds for
dismissal without any showing of specific intent to further the
unlawful aims of those parties. 2
* Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 87 S. Ct. 675 (1967).
1. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 255 F. Supp. 981 (1966).
2. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 87 S. Ct. 675 (1967).
The New York Civil Service Law sections 105 (1)a, (1)b, (1)c and
(3) which were declared unconstitutional read as follows:
Subversive activities; disqualification
1. Ineligibility of persons advocating overthrow of government by force or
unlawful means. No person shall be appointed to any office or position in
the service of the state or of any civil division thereof, nor shall any person
employed in any such office or position be continued in such employment,
nor shall any person be employed in the public service as superintendent,
principal or teacher in a public school or academy or in a state college or
any other state educational institution who:
(a) by word of mouth or writing wilfully and deliberately advocates,
advises, or teaches the doctrine that the government of the United States
or of any state or of any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown
or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means; or
(b) prints, publishes, edits, issues, or sells any book, paper, document
or written or printed matter in any form containing or advocating, advising
or teaching the doctrine that the government of the United States or of
422
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Loyalty oaths of some type have become an increasing problem
in many facets of American life. One writer in this area, claim-
ing to have made a conservative estimate, states that in 1958 at
least one out of five persons in the total labor force had taken
a test oath, or completed a loyalty statement, or achieved offi-
cial security clearance or survived some undefined private scrut-
iny as a condition of his employment.3 This statistic represents
any state or of any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown by
force, violence or any unlawful means, and who advocates, advises, teaches
or embraces the duty, necessity or propriety of adopting the doctrine con-
tained therein; or
(c) organizes or helps to organize or become a member of any society
or group of persons which teaches or advocates that the government of the
United States or of any state or of any political subdivision thereof shall
be overthrown by force or violence or by any unlawful means.
For the purposes of this section, membership in the communist party of
the United States of America or the communist party of the state of New
York shall constitute prima fade evidence of disqualification for appoint-
ment to or retention in any office or position in the service of the state or
of any city or civil division thereof.
(3) Removal for treasonable or seditious acts or utterances. A person in
the civil service of the state or of any civil division thereof shall be remov-
able therefrom for the utterance of any treasonable or seditious word or
words or the doing of any treasonable or seditious act or acts while holding
such position. For the purpose of this subdivision, a treasonable word or
act shall mean "treason", as defined in the penal law; a seditious word or
act shall mean "criminal anarchy" as defined in the penal law.
New York Education Law section 3021 reads as follows:
Removal of superintendents, teachers and employees for treasonable or
seditious acts or utterances.
A person employed as superintendent of schools, teacher or employee in
the public schools, in any city or school district of the state, shall be
removed from such position for the utterance of any treasonable or sedi-
tious word or words or the doing of any treasonable or seditious act or
acts while holding such position.
New York Education Law section 3022 (2) reads as follows:
2. The board of regents shall, after inquiry, and after such notice and
hearings as may be appropriate, make a listing of organizations which it
finds to be subversive in that they advocate, advise, teach or embrace the
doctrine that the government of the United States or of any state or of
any political subdivision thereof shall be overthrown or overturned by
force, violence or any unlawful means, or that they advocate, advise, teach
or embrace the duty, necessity or propriety of adopting any such doctrine,
as set forth in section twelve-a (now section 105) of the civil service law.
Such listings may be amended and revised from time to time. The board,
in maling such inquiry, may utilize any similar listings or designations
promulgated by any federal agency or authority authorized by federal
law, regulation or executive order, and for the purposes of such inquiry,
the board may request and receive from such federal agencies or authorities
any supporting material or evidence that may be made available to it. The
board of regents shall provide in the rules and regulations required by
subdivision one hereof that membership in any such organization included
in such listing made by it shall constitute prima facie evidence of disquali-
fication for appointment to or retention in any office or position in the
public schools of the state.
3. R. BROWN, LOYALTY AND SECURITY 181 (1958) ; 28 LAW AND CO NTM.




Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
424 SouTH CAEoLwA LAw REvw [Vol. 19
persons in both private and governmental positions including the
military.4 Although, as the foregoing demonstrates, this is a
problem of wide dimensions, the present discussion of loyalty
oaths will be mainly concerned with the teaching profession.
The loyalty oath is not a new creature in America. Oddly
enough, one of the earliest cases in this area to reach the Su-
preme Court involved a teacher. In 'um nnngs v. Hissouri,5 an
1867 case, a Catholic priest was convicted for teaching and
preaching without having ascribed to the state's oath which
sought to punish those who had been in sympathy with the
South during the Civil War. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction declaring the oath unconstitutional in that it operated
ex post facto and as a bill of attainder.
The above is illustrative of the fact that the three wars of ex-
tensive American involvement, the Civil War, World War I and
World War II have all spawned various loyalty programs to
ferret out those "disloyal" to the United States.( However, the
starting point of large scale programs was 1947, when President
Truman issued his loyalty order to federal employees. 7 For the
last twenty years, the impetus given by that order has led to the
wide spread use of loyalty programs. The Communist Party with
its attempted infiltration into all levels of our national life is
the reason for this continued growth. The height of the reaction
to this suspected infiltration came in the 1950's with Senator
McCarthy's hearings and the case of Dennis v. United States8
with its extensive publicity. The events of the 50's are like the
proverbial pebble cast upon calm waters. The effects of those
days are still rippling through our lives and remain a phenomo-
non of the Cold War.
The most notable aspect of the Dennis case was that it de-
clared the Smith Act 9 constitutional. The Court gave various
reasons for its interpretation of the act, but perhaps the real
reason for the Court's refusal to find the act unconstitutional
can be found in the following statement:
4. R. BROWN, supra note 3, at 181.
5. 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
6. R. BROWN, supra note 3, at 3. For a history of one state's loyalty-
security legislation, see CHAMBERLAIN, LOYALTY AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIoN
(1951), which deals with New York's attempts in this area.
7. R. BROWN, supra note 3, at 3.
8. 341. U.S. 491 (1951).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
10
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The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized
conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call
when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had
come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of
world conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and
with whom these petitioners were in the very least ideo-
logically attuned, convince us that these convictions were
justified .... 0
The Court viewed the Smith Act as a manifestation of Congress'
intent to punish what it considered subversive activities. This
view is strengthened by Mr. Justice Jackson's statement: "It
requires us to reappraise, in the light of our times and condi-
tions, constitutional doctrines devised under other circumstances
to strike a balance between authority and liberty."" The Court,
however, did limit the Dennis holding by requiring strict evi-
dence to sustain a conviction under the Smith Act.
12
It should be noted at this point that the states can no longer
criminally convict persons for subversive activities. In Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson,'3 the Court stated:
We examine these acts only to determine the Congressional
plan. Looking to all of them in the aggregate, the conclu-
sion is inescapable that Congress has intended to occupy the
field of sedition. Taken as a whole, they evince a Congres-
sional plan which makes it reasonable to determine that no
room has been left for the States to supplement it. There-
fore, a state sedition statute is superseded regardless of
whether it purports to supplement the federal law.' 4
At the time of the Nelson decision forty-two states, Alaska and
Hawaii had statutes which penalized the advocacy of violent
overthrow of government.:"
10. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 491, 510-11 (1951) (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 561 (concurring opinion).
12. See, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
The first two cases are examples of insufficiency of evidence to sustain convic-
tions under the Smith Act, while the last case did have a sufficiency of evi-
dence.
13. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
14. Id. at 504. As to whether or not dismissal constitutes punishment, con-
sider the case of a college professor barred from his profession and having to
seek employment where one's past is not considered. To he permanently ousted
from one's chosen profession would be worse than a prison sentence to many.
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Although the states can no longer convict persons for subver-
sive activity, the Court, by its decision in Adler v. Board of
Education,' sanctioned a form of punishment by allowing
the states to dismiss those persons suspected of subversive activi-
ties from public employment. It is interesting to note that some
of the provisions of the New York loyalty program declared
constitutional in Adler were found to be unconstitutional in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.17 Held to be constitutional in
Adler were New York Civil Service Law section 12-a (now sec-
tion 105) and New York Education Law section 3022.18 These
latter sections were declared to be unconstitutional in Keyishian
on the grounds of vagueness. In so ruling, the Court observed
that it had refused to consider the vagueness question in Adler
because the challenge had not been made in the pleadings or in
the proceedings in the lower courts. The sole vagueness conten-
tion in Adler concerned the word "subversive," appearing in the
preamble to and caption of New York Education Law section
3022.19
In addition to declaring constitutional the New York loyalty
program as applied to teachers, the Adler Court stated:
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law
to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will. It is
equally clear that they have no right to work for the State
in the school system on their own terms. They may work
for the school system upon reasonable terms laid down by
the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose
to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their
beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has the state thus
deprived them of any right of free speech or assembly? We
think not.
20
Rejecting this position, the Court, in Keyishian, observed,
"(The) constitutional doctrine which has emerged since that
decision has rejected its major premise."2' The Court further
stated,
16. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
17. 87 S. Ct 675, 679 (1967).
18. For text, see note 2, supra.
19. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 87 S. Ct. 675, 679 n.2 (1967).
20. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (emphasis added).
21. 87 S. Ct. 675, 684-85 (1967).
[Vol. 19
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However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cor-
rectly said in an earlier stage in the case,... the theory that
public employment which may be denied altogether may be
subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable,
has been uniformly rejected. Indeed, that theory was ex-
pressly rejected in a series of decisions following Adler. In
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963), we said: "It
is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed upon by the denial of or
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.1
22
In examining the constitutionality of the provisions of the
New York program barring employment by reason of member-
ship in a listed organization, 23 the Court again relied on an
emerging constitutional doctrine to strike them down. The Court
stated, "Mere knowing membership without a specific intent to
further the unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitu-
tionally adequate basis for exclusion from such positions as
those held by appellants. ' 24 The reasoning behind this doctrine
can be found in Elfbra'ndt v. Russel 25 where the Court struck
down Arizona's loyalty oath when challenged by a teacher.
There the Court stated:
Those who join an organization but do not share its unlaw-
ful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful
activities surely pose no threat either as citizens or as public
employees. Laws such as this which are not restricted in
scope to those who join with the "specific intent" to further
illegal action impose, in effect, a conclusive presumption
that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organiza-
tion.26
The proposition laid down by the Court with these decisions
is that there are good Communists and bad Communists. It ap-
pears that a good Communist is one who is seeking to foster the
"revolution" in the United States through peaceful means-
namely, one who uses the party as a political entity divorced
from any subversive activities and who wages war at the polls.
22. Id. at 685 (citations omitted).
23. N. Y. CIv. LAW § 105 (1)c.
24. 87 S. Ct. 675, 685 (1967).
25. 86 S. Ct. 1238 (1966).




Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
SouTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, the bad Communist is one who has the "spe-
cific intent" to overthrow the government by force, violence or
some similarly illegal means. It further seems that a Communist
of the former tenets cannot be barred from public employment
or any other right any more than a member of another political
party as long as his political beliefs do not affect his work. For
example, a good Communist should be allowed to teach so long
as his personal beliefs are not espoused in the classroom.
Another inescapable conclusion wrought by these decisions is
that loyalty oaths as such are now completely ineffectual. They
must be narrowly drawn so as to punish or bar only persons who
have the personal criminal purpose to overthrow the government
by force or violence. With an oath so drawn, everyone would
sign it whether they had the requisite intent or not. As Mr.
Justice Douglas said in the Elfbrandt case, "The communist
trained in fraud and perjury has no qualms in taking any
oath. 2 7 If anyone did refuse to sign because the oath applied
to him, he would not only be barred from some activity but
would bring himself within the sphere of the Smith Act and its
possible punishment of a 20,000 dollars fine or twenty years in
prison or both.23
This is not to suggest that government cannot continue to try
to protect itself from persons bent on subversive activities. The
Court in Dennis v. United States29 stated,
We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the
face of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried
to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one could
conceive that it's not within the power of Congress to pro-
hibit acts intended to overthrow the government by force
and violence.30
The status of loyalty oaths is now similar to that of confes-
sions. Namely, those who would seek to convict a person for
violation of the Smith Act or to bar him from public employ-
ment must rely on investigatory techniques coupled with strict
evidentiary material in order to achieve their aims.
C. TmoTn SuLivAN, JR.
27. Id. at 1242.
28. Smith Act, 13 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
29. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
30. Id. at 501.
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LABOR LAW-APPROPRIATE BARGAINING
UNIT-ALL RELEVANT FACTORS WILL BE
EXAMINED IN DETERMINING WHETHER A
CRAFT SHALL BE SEVERED*
The National Labor Relations Board's new policy on craft
severance as set out in Mallinckrodt Chemical YVorks' marks a
significant change from the standard previously established in
American Potash and Chemical Corporation.2 Mallinckrodt
Chemical Works is involved in the production of uranium under
a contract with the Atomic Energy Commission. Among the
plant workers were twelve instrument mechanics whom the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers sought to repre-
sent. In the past these workers had been part of a larger unit
represented by the Independent Union of Atomic Workers. In
dismissing the IBEW's petition the Board refused to base its
determination on the Potash standard which would have re-
quired that the IBEW have traditionally represented instrument
mechanics. The Board instead weighed all relevant factors, such
as the integration of the production process, the bargaining his-
tory of the larger unit, as well as the fact that the IBEW had
not traditionally represented instrument workers. The Board
also said they would apply the same standards on a case-by-case
basis to all petitions for severance of craft units regardless of
the industry involved.3 In order to appreciate fully the signifi-
cance of the Mallinckrodt case a brief review of past decisions in
this area is necessary.
In 1937 the Board announced its Globe4 doctrine as an at-
tempt to resolve controversies between craft and industrial units.
Under the doctrine announced in that case, craft employees were
permitted to decide whether they wanted separate representation
or wished to be included in a plant-wide unit. After the "Globe
election" the Board was to determine the unit in accordance with
the wishes of the craft employees.
* Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
1. 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
2. 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
3. 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
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The Globe decision was soon criticized as one which disre-
garded the interests of the majority and magnified the risk of
strikes by allowing a large increase in the number of separately
represented units within a plant. Two years later, in the Amer-
ican Can case,G the Board limited the Globe doctrine by holding
that a smaller unit could not be severed when a larger unit had
previously been established and where bargaining had success-
fully been carried on by the larger unit. But the American Can
ruling was not to remain as such for long. During the next few
years exceptions were made for pattern makers,7 brick layers,"
electricians9 and engineers. 10 These exceptions led to the craft
"identity" doctrine laid down in the General Electric case.1'
This new policy required that the group show itself to be a true
craft, that it had maintained its identity as a craft group and
that it had protested inclusion in the larger unit.12 Exceptions
were made for the crafts not in existence when the previous
determinations were made.'3
The uncertainty and dissention which stemmed from Amerizan
Can and the cases which followed were largely responsible for
the passage of section 9(b) (2) of the National Labor Relations
Act which provides:
[T]he board shall not . . . decide that any craft unit is
inappropriate ... on the ground that a different unit has
been established by a prior Board determination, unless a
majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote
against separate representation."'
4
The meaning of this section was questioned in the National
Tube case'9 in which it was contended that the section removed
from the Board's discretion not only the power to rely upon "a
5. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 159, 175 (1937) (dissenting opinion).
6. American Can Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1220 (1939).
7. Bendix Aviation Corp., 39 N.L.R.B. 81 (1942); Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
40 N.L.R.B. 838 (1942); Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 45 N.L.R.B. 369 (1942).
8. Aluminum Co. of America, 42 N.L.R.B. 772 (1942).
9. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 445 (1943).
10. Tampa Florida Brewery, Inc., 42 N.L.R.B. 642 (1942).
11. General Elec. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 57 (1944).
12. Id.
13. Allied Chem. and Dye Corp., 71 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1946); International
Minerals and Chem. Corp., 71 N.L.R.B. 878 (1946).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1935).
15. 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948).
[Vol. 19
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prior Board determination" in order to find a proposed craft
unit inappropriate, but also the power to find a craft unit inap-
propriate because of any collective bargaining history or of any
other circumstance upon which determinations have customarily
been based. The Board rejected this contention concluding "that
bargaining history in an industry may be considered as a
weighty factor. . ". ."I" The Board then demonstrated its intent
to consider "other circumstances" by refusing severance to brick-
layers in the steel industry because of the integrated nature of
the operations in that industry. This National Tube doctrine,
which denied severance within the steel industry, soon came to
include the lumber,17 wet millingI8 and aluminum industries."0
By 1953 the more important criteria which the Board devel-
oped in determining craft severance issues were:
(1) The employer's history of bargaining.
(2) The history, extent and type of organization of em-
ployees in other plants of the employer and of other em-
ployees in the same industry.
(3) The relationship between the proposed unit and the
employer's method of managing and operating the plant,
as for example, the extent to which the plant's operations
were integrated.
(4) The maintenance by the group seeking separate repre-
sentation of identity as a craft throughout the period of
bargaining on a more comprehensive basis, as illustrated by
such things as: (a) protesting inclusion in the broader unit;
(b) seeking to obtain recognition from the employer as a
separate unit; and (c) refraining from participation in the
activities of the union representing the broader unit.20
But in 1954 the Board decided the American Potash and Chemi-
eaZ Corporation case2 ' holding that, with the exception of the
16. Id. at 1205, 1206.
17. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949).
18. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 87 N.L.ThB. 187 (1949).
19. Permanent Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950).
20. M. Denbo, Random Thoughts on NLRB's American Potash Doctrine, 12
LAB. L.J. 249, 250 (1961).
21. 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
17
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"National Tube industries",2 2 craft unit severance would be per-
mitted if the employees involved constituted a true craft or
departmental group and if the union seeking to represent the
employees traditionally concerned itself with the problems of
the group involved. This, in effect, reversed the Nationad Tube
decision with regard to the construction of section 9 (b) (2) and
the denial of craft severance on the basis of integrated produc-
tion processes in an industry where the prevailing pattern of
bargaining is industrial in nature.
In Potash the Board limited its discretion by making the test
for determining the appropriate bargaining unit a more mechan-
ical one. This, in a sense, is violative of section 9(b) which
requires a determination by the Board "in each case."23 Another
fault in the Potash decision was demonstrated in NLRB v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Oo.24 where the court felt it unreason-
able to discriminate between the four "National Tube indus-
tries" and the plate glass industry when the same type of inte-
gration of operations and long history of bargaining existed in
both. This decision did not, however, cause the Board to change
its position, and the Potash standard was still applied.25
The Aallinek,'odt case26 represents a major change in the
policy used by the Board when considering requests for separa-
tion of craft employees from other plant workers for collective
bargaining purposes. The change can be attributed to dissatis-
faction with the Potash policy. It was felt that this policy gave
overriding importance, first, to its requirement that a unit, in
order to be severed, be composed of true craft employees and,
second, to the stringent "traditional representative" requirement.
The Board overruled Potash to the extent that it foreclosed in-
quiry into all relevant factors and to the extent that it limited
consideration of bargaining history and integration of operations
to the "National Tube" industries. The majority made its deter-
mination after a review of the legislative history of section
22. The so-called National Tube industries are steel, aluminum, wet milling
and lumber.
23. 29 U.S.C. 159(b) (1935).
24. 270 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1959).
25. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 885 (1960); Royal McBee
Corp., 127 N.L.R.B. 896 (1960).
26. 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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9(b) (2)27 and in accord with the Pittsburgh Plate Glass28 case
which had previously refused to allow exceptional treatment to
the four "National Tube" industries.
The Board's purpose in Mallinckrodt was to broaden its in-
quiry so as to permit evaluation of all factors relevant to in-
formed decisions in the area. Some of the "areas of inquiry"
which the majority deemed relevant are:
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of a distinct
and homogeneous group of skilled journeymen craftsmen
performing the functions of their craft on a nonrepetitive
basis, or of employees constituting a functionally distinct
department, working in trades or occupations for which a
tradition of separate representation exists.
2. The history of collective bargaining of the employees
sought at the plant involved, and at other plants of the
employer, with emphasis on whether the existing patterns
of bargaining are productive of stability in labor relations,
and whether such stability will be unduly disrupted by the
destruction of the existing patterns of representation.
3. The extent to which the employees in the proposed unit
have established and maintained their separate identity
during the period of exclusion in a broader unit, and the
extent of their participation or lack of participation in the
establishment and maintenance of the existing pattern of
representation and the prior opportunities, if any, afforded
them to obtain separate representation.
4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the
industry involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's production
processes, including the extent to which the continued nor-
mal operation of the production processes is dependent upon
27. The Board looked at the intentions of Congress when section 9(b) (2)
was enacted. They felt that history indicated this section was enacted out of
concern that the American Can doctrine unduly restricted craft employees
seeking separate representation. The majority weighed heavily Senate Report
No. 105 on S. 1126, in which Senator Taft said in part: "Our bill still leaves
to the Board discretion to review all the facts in determining the appropriate
unit." 1 Leg. Hist. 417 (emphasis added).
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the performance of the assigned functions of the employees
in the proposed unit.
6. The qualifications of the unit seeking to 'carve out' a
separate unit, including that union's experience in repre-
senting employees like those involved in the severance
action.2
9
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, Uranium Division, manufactures
uranium metal under a contract with the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. Of the 560 plant employees a group of 280 production
and maintenance employees are represented by the Independent
Union of Atomic Workers. Among these workers are twelve
instrument mechanics whom Local 1 of the International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers sought to sever from the overall
unit. The IBEW contended that it was entitled to a craft sever-
ance election because it had met the American Potash require-
ments. The majority concluded that the IBEW did not satisfy
the Potash test in that it had not established itself as a tradi-
tional representative of instrument mechanics. The Board
stated, however, that this in itself was not a decisive ground on
which to refuse severance.
It is interesting to note that the result in Mallinckrodt would
have been the same had the Board continued to apply the Potash
standard, but in Mallirwkrodt the fact that the IBEW failed to
qualify as a traditional representative was but one of the factors
weighed by the Board. In refusing severance, the Board also
considered (1) the highly integrated production process of the
plant, and the intimate relation of the instrument mechanics to
this process, (2) the successful bargaining history of the larger
unit, and (3) its seniority system for transfers, layoffs and
recalls. While the Board recognized that the instrument me-
chanics may be a group of skilled journeymen who might be
otherwise permitted to sever from a larger bargaining unit, they
felt that "[T]he separate community of interests which these
employees enjoy by reasons of their skills and training has been
largely submerged in the broader community of interests which
they share with other employees .... -3o The Board, therefore,
dismissed the IBEW's petition.81
29. 64 L.R.R.M. 1011, 1016 (1966).
30. Id. at 1017.
31. 64 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966).
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Board member Fanning, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that
a review of craft severance policies was necessary but felt Con-
gress had intended that the same tests be applied to severance
cases as to non-severance cases. He joined with the majority in
modifying Potash to the extent that it had foreclosed con-
sideration of all relevant factors in cases arising outside of
the "National Tube" industries, and in overruling the National
Tube decision to the extent that it foreclosed separate craft rep-
resentation. He felt there were many factors which indicated
that a separate unit was appropriate and that the majority gave
too much weight to the bargaining history of the plant.
3 2
On the same day that Mallinckrodt was decided, the Board
was able to apply its new test in Holmberg, In. 33 In this case
a petition was filed to sever tool and die workers from a larger
unit which was represented by the IBEW. The Board, in refus-
ing to permit severance, pointed out: (1) the tool and die
workers clearly shared a substantial community of interests with
the employees in the larger unit; (2) although the workers pos-
sessed special skills, their work was not confined to tasks requir-
ing the exercise of such skills; and (3) the tasks of the workers
were an integral part of the production process in which the
larger unit was engaged. In reaching its conclusion, the Board
considered these factors but seemed to put the most weight on
the successful bargaining history of the larger unit and the fact
that the tool and die workers were the highest paid group in the
plant. In his dissent, -Member Fanning, once again objected to
the controlling weight given to the length of the plant's bar-
baining history.34
In E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.,35 also handed down on
the same day as Mfallinclkrodt, the Board ordered that the elec-
tricians, in whose behalf the IBEW was petitioning, hold an
election to determine whether there would be a craft severance.
The Board recognized the high degree of integration of the pro-
duction process but felt that this in itself should not bar separate
representation of the electricians. The Board relied to some
extent on the specialization of the electricians and on the lengthy
32. Id. at 1017 (dissenting opinion).
33. 64 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1966).
34. Id. at 1027 (dissenting opinion).
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training period through which they must go, and felt this should
allow them to retain their separate identity. But probably most
important, the Board, in granting the petition, noted that there
had been no history of bargaining at the plant. Member Fan-
ning concurred with the majority except to the extent that it
relied on the absence of bargaining history in finding the unit
appropriate.30
Now that the Board has thrown out the mechanical test of
Potash and announced that it will exercise discretion in consid-
ering all relevant factors in each case, it will be interesting to see
just how the Board will use its discretion in the future. It
appears that, thus far, the most important factor will be the
bargaining history of the plant. If Member Fanning's observa-
tions are correct, it is not only the most important but also the
controlling factor. If the success and length of bargaining his-
tory is given controlling weight, the Board may preclude them-
selves from considering other relevant factors. Will this factor
be given so much weight so as to, in effect, make the test
mechanical once again?
JoEL E. GoTrmB
36. Id. at 1025 (concurring opinion).
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22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss3/13
LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE INDIGENT-THE
FEASIBILITY OF USING CORPORATIONS
FUNDED BY FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONSO
"The Economic Opportunity Act and its provisions for the
Legal Services Program is perhaps the most important evidence
that the law is again coming alive as a living process responsive
to the changing human needs."' But the advent of federal inter-
vention into the realm of legal assistance for the indigent has
presented judicial quandaries for the administration and organi-
zation of these services. Recently, an organizational proposal
came before the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
in the form of applications for the corporate practice of law to
be funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. The court,
through Judge Breitel, denied the proposal without prejudice
on the grounds of substantial deviation from legal policy and
ethics, and indefiniteness.
New York law prescribes that the only corporation which
shall be allowed to engage in the practice of law is one "organ-
ized for benevolent or charitable purposes approved by the
appellate division of the supreme court. .. ."2 In denying ap-
proval of the proposals, the appellate division set forth guide-
lines by which the applications could be approved.
The applications came before the court from the Community
Action for Legal Services, Inc. (CALS), the New York Legal
Assistance Corporation (NYLAC), and the Harlem Assertion
of Rights, Inc. (HAR). As a whole, they sought approval for
the establishment of neighborhood law offices which were to
provide legal services and education for the financially disad-
vantaged and for the disfavored minorities through the use of
federal funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity.
CALS was not to practice law, but was to be a financial dele-
gate agency of a community organization and was primarily to
oversee, control and direct the finances to the subsidiary corpo-
rations which would practice law. CALS' board of directors
* Application of Community Action for Legal Servs., 274 N.Y.S.2d 779
(App. Div. 1966).
1. Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., First Annual Conference of
Legal Services Project Directors, Nov. 1966.
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was to have had the power to establish guidelines for the opera-
tion of legal service programs of CALS' delegate agencies, to
insure concurrance with these guidelines, to create training
programs for the lawyers and lay personnel of these delegate
agencies, and to conduct audits. Although a majority of the
board members were to have been attorneys, more than one third
of the members were to have come from various poverty area
committees in New York City.
NYLAG, proposed to be the principle delegate of CALS, was
to have had the power to operate its own neighborhood offices
and to contract with other agencies and organizations for the
provision of legal services. NYLAC's board of directors was to
have consisted of thirteen attorneys and seven representatives of
the poor, one representative to have been recommended by the
appropriate community agency in each of the seven areas where
NYLAC was to have set up offices. CALS was to administer
the funds; and initially the operation of the seven neighborhood
offices would be left to the discretion of NYLAC, another dele-
gate agency, or an existing legal aid society. In other words, the
creation of NYLAC would not bar each area from establishing
its own offices with CALS, through NYLAC, furnishing the
funds and assistance.
HAR was proposed for the establishment and maintenance of
five neighborhood offices in Harlem under the auspices of
CALS and NYLAC, each of these offices to render services
ranging from legal advocacy to community legal education on
the rights of the accused. Initially, legal services were to have
been limited to those completely unable to hire private counsel.
Standards would be broadened. The board of directors of HAR
was to have been made up of fifteen members, only six of which
were to have been attorneys. "Plainly enough the office of
Economic Opportunity guidelines were framed to put the lawyer
in the driver's seat. The guidelines assure that professional
judgment shall be free not only from local pressures but also
from Washington pressures."13
The proposals were denied because the organizational plan
would have resulted in lay control over the practice of law, neces-
sarily accompanied by diminished court control over legal prac-
tice. The complex interrelationships would doubtlessly have led
3. Brennan, supra note 1.
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to an uncontrollable pyramiding of sub-delegation, making prob-
able the co-existence of anti-poverty neighborhood law offices in
the same areas under different sponsors. Although not judicially
concerned with the waste which would naturally result from the
duplication and competition when more than one office is placed
in a single area, the court is vitally interested in the control of
these legal entities which could never be effective within the
proposed organizational maze, even if the non-attorney controls
were completely eliminated.
The most fundamental change suggested by the court was the
use of one licensed corporation which would distribute all fed-
eral funds in an area. All delegate agencies would thereby be
responsible to only one directorate, and the court could effec-
tively reach the one directorate to assure the maintenance of the
ethical and disciplinary standards indispensible to the legal pro-
fession.
The federal agency would furnish the money and the audit,
and the one corporation would disperse the funds among the
various offices in the needy districts of New York; and
therefore, the intricate complexity is not necessary because
one corporation could serve as a buffer or insulator between
the source of the funds and the practice of law, delegating
the work to such subsidiaries as it deems necessary.4
The proposals, therefore, were completely unworkable because
of the "clumsy overlapping, excessive layers of organizations
and built-in incentives to competitive anti-poverty law offices
operating in the same area."5
Although the application for a charter to form a charitable
corporation is generally ex parte and granted pro forma, a
Pennsylvania court, several months prior to the applications
submitted to the New York Appellate Division, approved the
application for charter by the Community Legal Services, Inc.
(CLS) over strong objection by the practicing lawyers of
Philadelphia.6 With the exception of the problem of organiza-
tional complexity which faced the New York court, the objec-
4. Telephone interview with Judge Breitel, New York Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, Feb. 1967.
5. Application of Community Action For Legal Servs., 274 N.Y.S. 2d 779,
787 (App. Div. 1966).
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tions to the approval of the CLS charter were similar to those
thrust upon the New York Appellate Division; and a contrast
and comparison of how the courts handled the analogous prob-
lems will shed some light on the judicial theories which are
evolving in this, the genesis of a necessary addition to the legal
profession.
The primary corporate purpose of CLS as stated in its appli-
cation for charter was to "provide legal aid assistance" to those
"who appear worthy thereof but by reason of poverty lack the
wherewithal to procure the same."7 The court, realizing that the
decision could have important implications for Philadelphia and
the nation as to Legal Services Programs, approved the applica-
tions pursuant to the Pennsylvania Non-profit Corporation law
under which the purpose must be "lawful and not injurious to
the community."" CLS' board of directors includes six members
of the Philadelphia Bar, two members each from the Legal Aid
Society and Defender Association, one member from the law
schools on a rotating basis, the chairman of the Civil Rights
Committee and the Public Service Committee, and seven repre-
sentatives of the poor communities selected by the Community
Action Councils in the areas served by CLS. Each neighborhood
office is staffed by full-time attorneys; and the non-profit cor-
poration provides educational programs through local law
schools and universities which educate the poor in the basic
civil rights of every citizen, giving the poor members of the
community stature even though their economic status remains
the same.
The objections to the application for charter voiced by the
practicing attorneys of Philadelphia included undue control of
a local program by federal agencies, diminished income to the
lawyers who now handle many prospective CLS clients, im-
proper restraint on the indigent's ability to select counsel inde-
pendently, indefinite standards of indigency, representation of
the poor on the board of directors and possible violations of the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Each of these objections will be
disposed of by comparing the Pennsylvania court's discussion to
that of the New York court on similar problems.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
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The Pennsylvania court did not concern itself with the possi-
bility of lay control of the legal practice because the organiza-
tional proposal before it was not complex and interrelated; and
it did not find any evil in the federal government's exercise of
control over local programs which it financially supports. As-
serting that the only federal control would be to assure compli-
ance with federal statutes and regulations, the court stated that
such control would be welcome in weeding out the type programs
which had been unsatisfactory in other localities. The New
York view, on the other hand, was that there should be an
insulating entity, CALS, between the financial support and the
practice of law; and it was suggested that audit control be left
directly to the federal agency and the corporate entity, provided
that the corporation's participation in the audit never involved
any control over the practice of law. The New York court was
also faced with the probability of ultimate lay control over the
practicing lawyers in the corporate womb. Lay control over
legal practice is considered violative of public policy because the
public is entitled to be protected by the court's ultimate con-
trol over those who practice law. This policy is of primary con-
cern to the court in order that it maintain summary and direct
control over professional and ethical standards required by the
New York Code which limits the practice of law solely to licensed
professionals. 9 In other words, the court saw a need for diverse
representation in the requirements of the federal agency for
community involvement, but suggested that these needs be met
in councils or other policy groups and not in a lay-controlled
board of directors or office management. The court must be
able to supervise those whom it sanctions; and in the event that
professional standards are violated, large directorates would only
bring a diffusion and delegation of managerial duties which
would make ineffective any attempt of discipline by the court.
Judge Breitel stated that attorneys need not sponsor legal
assistance corporations for them to be created; but once such
corporations come into being, the attorney and his profession
must be severed from those who are not attorneys. There must
be a complete separation of laymen and lawyers, particularly in
the hiring and fiscal functions which should be vested exclu-
sively in the attorneys.
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The argument that CLS would deplete a substantial number
of practicing lawyers' incomes was disposed of by the court's
reference to the fact that a very substantial majority of the
poor utilize no private attorneys, and therefore would never get
legal aid if the practicing attorneys waited for the poor to con-
tact them. Generally, the poor have little or no knowledge of
their rights and are distrustful of attorneys. Granted, some re-
tain counsel; but when it means depriving the family of necessi-
ties, few attorneys do or desire to build their practices on such
retainers. This point was not raised by the New York court
because of the fact that the proceeding there was ex parte.
Another point which the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court did not raise was that of the indigents' right to
choose their own counsel independently. The Pennsylvania court
rejected this argument by emphasizing that this right means
little to one who has no money to spend for legal aid, and who
probably would not know how to exercise it even if he knew he
had it. The indigent need lawyers in their own neighborhoods
since most never venture from their ghettos, especially in search
of legal aid from those whom they fear and distrust.
The objectors to the Philadelphia application called the stand-
ards of indigency improper; but the court rebutted the accusa-
tion with the proposal that the standards of indigency which
merit legal assistance should be a matter of continuing study by
the Bar Association so that a flexible standard can be arrived at
which will fluctuate with the economic situation in the Phila-
delphia community. The New York court, however, found that
CALS, the parent corporation, had set down nebulous and ill-
defined guidelines for the operation of neighborhood law
offices; and the proposals, as submitted, would have allowed the
corporate subsidiaries to represent groups and minorities with-
out providing the standards which individuals from these groups
or minorities must meet to be eligible for legal assistance. In
addition, the use of a referral system in the Harlem districts and
a lack of definite standards of eligibility are harmful in that
New York has its Puerto Rican and Negro Minorities which
would be served by these legal services; and one minority
would not trust another minority to handle their work, and,
therefore, there are legal standards which are necessary to
28
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prevent others than these minorities in their special sections
from getting this legal aid.10
The representation of the poor on the CLS board of directors
is in keeping with the congressional mandate calling for the
participation by the poor in the OEO programs with the overall
direction of the program by the Bar; and thus, the objection to
the seven representatives on the CLS board of directors was
overcome. The poor should have a voice in what is being done
for them, since not all the questions which are put before the
board are purely legal. The poor will be indispensible in setting
up the best ways to educate the indigent and the best places to
set up neighborhood offices since the poor, in these fields, have
vital interests and can give invaluable insight to the problems.
In other words, the Pennsylvania court is a proponent of doing
with the poor, not only to and for them.
Consideration of the Canons of Professional Ethics was a pre-
dominant factor in both the Pennsylvania and New York courts.
Canon 27 makes it "unprofessional to solicit professional em-
ployment" by any means; however, an exception has been made
where free legal services are provided to indigents whose con-
stitutional rights have allegedly been violated."- Bar Associa-
tions with legal clinics and referral services have been allowed
to publish material to make the public aware of legal services
so long as it is done in good faith.12 Such publications are not
to inure to the benefit-of the attorneys but the public at large.
Canon 28 forbids "a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit" or to secure clients in such a manner or to use agents
or runners for the same purpose; and although private lawyers
would be prohibited from inviting clients to use their services,
any Community Legal Services Program must contemplate the
possibility that attorneys in the program will give lectures to
indigent groups on their legal rights and the availability of free
services, and may even invite them to use these free services.
New insight to the limits of Canon 28 were established by the
10. Telephone interview with Judge Breitel, New York Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, Feb. 1967.
11. Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Opinion No. 148,
(Nov. 16, 1935).
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United Statees Supreme Court in NAACP v. Button" where
the NAACP, to eliminate legal barriers to segregation, actively
solicited potential plaintiffs to designate NAACP lawyers to
represent them in actions, all costs borne by the NAACP. The
Supreme Court, reversed the Virginia court and held that these
practices are permissible under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments as to freedom of association and expression. The prohibi-
tion of Canon 28 was "a lawyer to attempt to reap gain";14 but
here
[N]o monetary stakes are involved, and so there is no danger
that the attorney will desert or subvert the paramount in-
terests of his client to enrich himself or an outside spon-
sor .... 15 Laymen cannot be expected to know how to pro-
tect their rights and for them to associate together to
preserve and enforce rights granted them under Federal
laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal ethics.'6
Canon 35 states that "the professional services of a lawyer
should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency which
intervenes between client and lawyer," especially excluding
"charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent" but "Legal
Aid and Defender Associations have never been considered by
the Bar as within the class of prohibited lay intermediaries."'17
Canons 27 and 35, not covered by any Supreme Court decision,
"require revision to reflect the realities of the day to day
problems" facing the poverty attorneys.' 8 A committee of the
American Bar Association has undertaken this task because of
the growing movement to extend legal services to the poor.' 9
The New York court read the Canons more restrictively than
did the Pennsylvania court, especially in regard to the relatively
unrestricted use of laymen as investigators or runners for the
neighborhood offices. Standards and control devices are of
paramount importance where the outside lay employees are
13. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
14. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
15. Id. at 443.
16. Id. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainman v. Viso, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
17. Community Legal Servs., Inc., C.P. No. 4968, 61 (Pa., Mar. 1966).
18. Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., First Annual Conference
of Legal Services Project Directors, Nov. 1966.
19. See, WRIGHT, THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, NAT. CON. ON
LAW AND POVERTY, Coz-r. PRoc., p. 14 (1964).
[Vol. 19
30
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss3/13
COMMENTS
involved, since there is a danger to the public in the unrestricted
use of these investigators, but the New York court mentioned
the existence of total prohibition in the Canons.
The neighborhood law offices have been analogized to the
retail sale of goods; for without these offices, inflation in justice
arises by keeping the legal profession out of the reach of the
consumer and, therefore, injustice is done to the poor man. Jus-
tice under the law must be a product for mass consumption, and
the difficulties go to deficiencies in the legal system itself.2 '
There must be established mechanisms for settling disputes in
the form of neighborhood court systems which would decen-
tralize and delegate certain functions to local courts so as to
relieve overcrowded downtown courts.
22
Recently a summary judgment upheld another OEO program
against contentions by the Texas Society of Practicing Lawyers
that the legal services program was a violation of Canon 28
which prohibits the solicitation of business. 23 The Superior
Court of California denied the request of a County Bar Associa-
tion to enjoin the operation of the California Rural Legal As-
sistance Program since the Bar Association failed to show
irreparable harm.24 The California approval came despite the
fact that no California cases expressly approved legal services
for the poor by non-profit corporations because of the fact that
it was "probable that if the question were presented, the Ap-
pellate courts will say this is lawful, subject to reasonable
controls designed to protect the public. '25
Despite the approvals of Legal Assistance Corporations
funded by the OEO, the proposals which came before the Ap-
pellate Division of the New York Supreme Court had to be
denied because they indiscriminately intermingled social goals
with the legitimate practice of law and presented a danger to
the general principle of public protection. Social goals and legal
practice are two interests which should be separated and pre-
20. E. Cahn & J. Calm, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Re-
visited, 41 NoRE DAmE LAW, 927 (1966).
21. See E. Calm and J. Cahn, The War o, Poverty: A Civilian Perspective,
73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
22. See, A. Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program,
31 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROP. 211, 231-49 (1966).
23. O.E.O. Public Affairs, 67-42, at 30 (Mar. 1, 1967).
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cisely defined, especially in regard to the vaguely suggested sub-
programs providing for the education of the minorities as to
their inherent rights as United States citizens. The courts do
not wish to become involved in the actual management or selec-
tion of those who would shoulder the responsibilities of the
management, but merely want to assure public safety. Through
a separation of social interests and legal standards, the court's
role can be preserved to consider and pass independently upon
the conduct of corporations engaged in the practice of law. The
federal aid programs are young and may be self-assured; but
with the possible dangers of mistakes, abuse, and the ever-
fluctuating federal policies and financial support, any authority
granted by the court for the practice of law, according to the
New York court, should be limited in time.
But for the indefinite and complex proposals, the appel-
late division would have approved the applications. The court
conceded that the social programs were important and must
operate alongside the traditional legal aid societies. The court
still requires, however, that public protection be paramount,
even if "factional, political and narrow interests be subordinated
or ignored ' 20 when in conflict with the duty of the court to
assure the public stable recourse to the court if and when legal
standards or ethics are violated. The policy of protecting the
people is still the underlying principle upon which the judicial
system was established, even though "[Tihe Economic Oppor-
tunity Act and its provisions for the Legal Services Program is
perhaps the most important evidence that the law is again com-
ing alive as a living process responsive to the changing human
needs.1127
J'Aw L. WAR mR
26. Telephone interview with Judge Breitel, New York Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, Feb. 1967.
27. Address by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., First Annual Conference
of Legal Services Project Directors, Nov. 1966.
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